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1. Preliminary Remarks 
In the very much awaited judgement Molla Sali v. Greece1, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights held that the applicant’s inability to inherit under a public will made in her favor by her 
death husband, a member of the Muslim community of Western Thrace, was in violation of Article 14, 
read in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol No. 1, of the European Convention. 
Greece’s condemnation touches to the core the dilemma surrounding the conflicting relationships among 
members of a minority community and the community itself and that arising between the State, and its 
legitimacy to intervene on the dissident member’s behalf, vis-à-vis to the group. 
By refusing to fully endorse Greece’s system of protection towards the Muslim community of Western 
Thrace, the European Court of Human Rights has for the very first time confronted itself with the 
compliance with the European Convention of a minority rights regime2 centered on a legal pluralistic 
                                                          
* Peer reviewed.  
1 Grand Chamber Judgement, 18 December 2017. For a comment, see İ. TSAVOUSOGLOU, The Curious Case of Molla 
Sali v. Greece: Legal Pluralism Through the Lens of the ECtHR, in strasbourgobserver.com, 2019; H. SURREL, Interdiction de 
discrimination – Les droits de l’homme l’emportent sur les droit collectifs (Court EDH, Gde Ch., 19 déc. 2018, Molla Sali c/Grèce, 
n. 20452/14), in , 2019; C. M. CERNA, Molla Sali v. Greece (Eur. Ct. H.R.), in International Legal Material, Volume 58, 
Issue 2, 280 ss. 
2 It is also worth recalling that, following Refah Partisi & Others v. Turkey, Molla Sali v. Greece is the second case where 
the ECtHR is asked to confront with the compatibility of Sharia Law with the European Convention.  
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model, that exempts its members from the application of State laws in favour of a system of religious 
personal law3. 
Moving far and beyond the specificities of Molla Sali v. Greece, the article seeks to examine the European 
Court’s approach towards minority rights, including the right to choose not to exercise a minority right, 
in the light of Article 14 ECHR. 
Within this perspective, the approach is twofold.  
First and foremost, the article will focus on the European Court’s finding of a discrimination by 
association on religious ground, without conversely ascertaining the alleged violation of Article 14 
suffered by the applicant as qualified member of the minority. 
Second, taking into consideration the minority rights context, the article seeks to look at the European 
Court’s attempt to balance collective and individual rights through the lens of the Framework 
Convention’s right to free self-identification. 
The article aims at questioning whether the European Court of Human Rights is embracing a minority 
rights awareness throughout its case-law and whether is paving the way to new balancing strategies 
between dissident members and the minority community as a whole. 
The article argues that, despite the outcome of the judgement, the Grand Chamber has not yet taken 
side, neither has offered hints as to the proper convention approach to solve intra-communitarian 
conflicts, opting instead for a redesign of the legal question behind the case, by making use of the iura 
novit curia principle, centered not so much on the applicant, but rather on her husband.  
At the outset, the Judgement seems emblematic of the Grand Chamber’s attempt to save the best of both 
worlds. On the one hand, Greece is condemned on the basis of the unequal treatment reserved to those 
belonging to the Muslim community of Western Thrace with respect to Greek non-members on the 
ground that the Respondent State does not allow  minority members to not identify themselves with the 
community. 
                                                          
3 On the specifics of Greece, see K. TSITSELIKIS, Aspects of Legal Communitarianism in Greece: Between Millet and 
Citizenship, Ofiati Socio-legal Series, 2012, 106 ss. and Seeking to Accommodate Shari'a within a Human Rights Framework: 
The Future of the Greek Sharia Courts, Journal of Law and Religion, 2012, ss.. For a comparative analysis of countries that 
ensure the application of Sharia through a system of religious Courts, see Y. SEZGIN, Human Rights under State-
Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt, and India, Cambridge University Press, 2013. On the specifics of issues 
related to the challenges of religion when coupled with personal law system, see J. L. COHEN, C. LABORDE (eds.), 
Religion, Secularism, and Constitutional Democracy, Columbia University Press, 2015 with a reference Y. ERGAS, 
Regulating Religion Beyond Borders: The Case of FGM/C. 
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On the other, Greece is condoned for granting the Muslim community to quasi self-govern itself in 
violation of the principle of gender equality4. 
 
2. The Case and the European Court’s Judgement 
The case of Molla Sali lies in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, known as millets system, and in the 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne5 that amended the previous 1920 Treaty of Sevres, favoring the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict opposing Greece to Turkey at the outset of World War I6. 
Following the Treaty of Lausanne, the Muslim minority of Western Thrace benefited of a system of 
protection, that features elements of territorial and non-territorial autonomy7, resulting in the applicability 
of Sharia Law to family law matters (MFLs, Muslim Family Laws) in the light of a personal law system 
based on the functioning of a partial religious jurisdiction, so-called Muftis system. 
The Mufti system was though introduced before the Lausanne Treaty according to Law no. 147 of 1914, 
that defined areas where Sharia Law would have been applied, and Law no. 2395 of 1920 that recognized 
the religious jurisdiction of the Muftis in controversies among Muslims belonging to the minority 
community.  
Following Law no. 147 of 1914, Sharia Law has been further recognized applicable to succession rules 
and Mufti judgements enforceable, once ratified by a civil Court of first instance. 
At the time of the application, members of the Muslim community of Wester Thrace were also denied 
the right to opt for the civil adjudication of a case, that was compulsory remitted to the Mufti, whose 
procedure was hardly believed in compliance with the convention guarantees set forth under Article 6 of 
the European Convention.  
International Treaties and State laws therefore concurred in shaping Greece’s system of minority 
protection, that results in the combination of personal and territorial principles. 
                                                          
4 On the condition of minority women in Western Thrace, see S. KOFINIS, The Status of Muslim Minority Women in 
Greece: Second Class European Citizens?, in D. SCHIEK, A. LAWSON (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and 
Intersectionality, Ashgate, 2010, 125 ss. 
5 Reference is to Article 45, but, more generally to Articles 37-45 dedicated to the protection of minorities. For a 
more detailed investigation, see K. TSITSELIKIS, A surviving Treaty: The Lausanne Minority protection in Greece and Turkey, 
in K. HENRARD (ed.), The Interrelation between the Right to Identity of Minorities and their Socio-economic Participation, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2013, 287 e ss. 
6 On this, see K. TSITSELIKIS, Old and New Islam in Greece - From Historical Minorities to Immigrant Newcomers, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2012. 
7 For an insight into the ways in which States might safeguard minority rights through forms of autonomy, see, 
among others, T.H. MALLOY, F. PALERMO (eds.), Minority Accomodation through Territorial and Non-Territorial 
Autonomy, Oxford University Press, 2015. 
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The Mufti jurisdiction operates solely with respect to those who are Muslims (subjective requirement) 
and who, at the same time, reside in the territory of Western Thrace (territorial or objective requirement).  
Molla Sali, the applicant, is a woman belonging to the Muslim community of Western Thrace who tried 
to challenge the application of Sharia Law to an inheritance dispute arisen following the death of her 
husband who made a public will in accordance with the Greek civil code provisions. 
The applicant’s resort to the Greek civil code was therefore on the basis of the judicial proceeding 
undertaken by the two sisters of the applicant’s husband, who claimed the applicability of Sharia Law to 
the dispute, asking for the annulment of the public will. 
At the domestic level, the Rodopi Court of First Instance rejected the two sisters’ claim, arguing the 
violation of the constitutional right to equality, non-discrimination and self-determination in that Sharia 
Law would have caused an illegitimate difference in treatment on the ground of religion. 
Within the same line of reasoning stands the Thrace Court of Appeal, that likewise contested the 
jurisdiction of the Mufti with respect to public wills, emphasizing the deceased’s right to opt for the civil 
law regime over Sharia Law. 
On the contrary, the Court of Cassation reversed the previous judgments arguing in favour of the 
compulsory application of Sharia Law on the basis of its conformity with the Greek Constitution and 
concluding for the invalidity of the public will. 
Following the negative outcome of domestic proceedings and relying on the system of minority 
accommodation, the applicant invoked before the European Court of Human Rights8 the violation of 
the civil limb of Article 6 ECHR, alone and in conjunction with Article 14, because of the Court of 
Cassation’s refusal to scrutinize the merit of the case on the sole ground of the applicant’s religious 
affiliation9, and of Article 1, Protocol no. 1, due to the applicant’s inability to inherit her husband’s 
properties following the compulsory application of Sharia Law. 
Despite the applicant’s allegations and accordingly to the iura novit curia principle, the Grand Chamber 
conversely chose to examine the case from the sole standpoint of the violation of Article 1, Protocol no. 
1, in conjunction with Article 14, holding that “since the main focus of the present case is the Court of 
Cassation’s refusal to apply the law of succession as laid down in the Civil Code for reasons linked to the 
                                                          
8 On the exceptional features of the application within a more general trend of the Muslim minority of Western 
Thrace to refrain from bringing cases before Courts, see M. MARKOVITI, The ECtHR as a Venue for Greco-Turkish 
Relations: The Treaty of Lausanne and the Muslim Minority in Western Thrace, Working Paper no. 3, Mobilise GrassRoots, 
2017. 
9 For an in-depth analysis and critique of the denied investigation as to the alleged violation of the applicant’s right 
to access to justice, see E. KALAMPAKOU, Is there a right to choose a religious jurisdiction over civil courts? The application of 
Sharia law in the minority Western Thrace, Greece, in Religions, 2019. 
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Muslim faith of the testator, the applicant’s husband, the primary issue arising is whether there was a 
difference in treatment potentially amounting to discrimination as compared with the application of the 
law of succession, as laid down in the Civil Code, to those seeking to benefit from a will as drawn up by 
a testator who was not of Muslim faith”10. 
Once framed the analysis in the light of Article 14 ECHR, the Grand Chamber moves on verifying 
whether the applicant “was in an analogous or relevantly similar situation to that of a married female 
beneficiary of a non-Muslim husband’s will”. 
The positive outcome of the comparison, given the successful evaluation of the ambit test underneath 
the applicability of Article 14, justifies the in-depth evaluation on the proportionality of the difference in 
treatment originated from the mandatory application of Sharia Law to the estate at issue. 
Leaving, though arguably, aside the question as to whether the aim of protecting the Muslim minority of 
Western Thrace through the compulsory application of Sharia Law was legitimate, the Grand Chamber 
focuses instead on the “question of the proportionality of the difference in treatment complained to that 
aim”11.  
The Grand Chamber mentions at least four reasons supporting the argument of the violation of Article 
14, read in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol No. 1, of the European Convention. 
First, the Court notes that, although the system of protection afforded to the Muslim community of 
Western Thrace derives from international obligations, nor the Treaty of Sevres nor that of Lausanne 
ever required Greece to implement systems of parallel jurisdiction such as that of the Muftis12, neither to 
compulsory apply Sharia Law. 
Secondly, and according to Greek Law no. 1920/1991 which “refers solely to Islamic wills and intestate 
succession”13, no jurisdiction of the Mufti over other types of inheritance is to be found in the Law.  
As a third argument, the Grand Chamber recalls the legal uncertainty that emerges from the case-law at 
the national level, that does not show a clear-cut interpretation as to the compatibility of Sharia Law with 
                                                          
10 See § 86. 
11 See § 144. 
12 See, § 151, “[t]he Court notes that there can be no doubt that in signing and ratifying the Treaties of Sèvres and 
Lausanne Greece undertook to respect the customs of the Muslim minority. However, in view of the wording of 
the provisions in question […], those treaties do not require Greece to apply Sharia law. Indeed, the Government 
and the applicant agreed on that point. More specifically, the Treaty of Lausanne does not explicitly mention the 
jurisdiction of the mufti, but guarantees the religious distinctiveness of the Greek Muslim community, which was 
excluded from the population exchange provided for in that treaty and was expected to remain in Greece, where 
the large majority of the population was Christian. Nor did the treaty confer any kind of jurisdiction on a special 
body in relation to such religious practice”. 
13 See, § 152. 
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the principle of equal treatment and with human rights law14. A legal uncertainty “which is incompatible 
with the requirements of the rule of law”15 and which contradicts the Government’s argument that the 
compulsory application of Sharia Law derives from a “duty to honor [Greece’s] international obligations 
and the specific situation of the Thrace Muslim minority”16. 
Not so much clarifying whom to side with, the Grand Chamber moves on to the fourth and main 
argument that lies in the criticisms and concerns that the mandatory application of Sharia Law gives rise 
internationally as to the unequal status of women and children compared to men within Muslim 
communities and towards the majority. 
Here, the question appears swinging between the controversial compatibility of Sharia Law to 
international human rights law standards, left aside, to that of the safeguard of individual rights within 
closed communities, especially when it comes down to women17 and children.  
With this regard, the Grand Chamber holds that: “several international bodies have expressed their 
concern about the application of Sharia law to Greek Muslims in Western Thrace and the discrimination 
thus created, in particular against women and children, not only within that minority as compared with 
men, but also in relation to non-Muslim Greeks. Thus, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights, in his report on the rights of minorities in Greece, noted that the application of Sharia law to 
matters concerning family law and inheritance was incompatible with the international undertakings 
entered into by Greece, particularly after its ratification of the post-1948 international and European 
human rights treaties, including those relating to the rights of the child and women’s rights”18. 
The unique reference to gender is further abandoned, as the Grand Chamber chooses to focus on 
freedom of religion, neglecting that it “require[s] the Contracting States to create a particular legal 
framework in order to grant religious communities a special status entailing specific privileges”19 and, be 
as it may, it nonetheless requires the State to safeguard parity of rights within and outside the minority.  
                                                          
14 See, § 153. 
15 Ibid. 
16 See, § 146. 
17 For a fruitful discussion on the challenges faced by group rights when coupled with the gender discourse, see, 
for example, S.M. OKIN, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women, J. Cohen, M. Howard, M. Nussbaum eds., Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women, Princeton University Press, 1999 and Mistress of their own destiny: group rights, gender and 
realistic rights of exit, Ethics, 2002, 205 ss.; S. BENHABIB, The claims of culture: equality and diversity in the global era, 
Princeton University Press, 2002; A. SACHAR, Multiculturalism Jurisdictions: cultural differences and human rights, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
18 See, § 154. 
19 See, § 155. 
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States’ obligation to ensure equal rights within and outside the minority community is further linked to 
the crucial right to free self-identification20, derived from the Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities, interpreted as a “cornerstone of international law on the protection of minorities 
in general”21.  
The Grand Chamber hinges on it its main argumentation, maintaining that, on the one hand, the State 
must not: “take on the role of guarantor of the minority identity of a specific population group to the 
detriment of the right of that group’s members to choose not to belong to it or not to follow its practices 
and rules” – and, on the other, that – “[r]efusing members of a religious minority the right to voluntarily 
opt for and benefit from ordinary law amounts not only to discriminatory treatment but also to a breach 
of a right of cardinal importance in the field of protection of minorities, that is to say the right to free 
self-identification”22. 
The Grand Chamber lingers in particular on the negative aspect of the right to free self-identification, 
asking the State and the members of the minority to respect the free and informed choice of the member 
to not to be treated as such23. 
Despite the coming into force of the new law, which grants members of the Muslim minority of Western 
Thrace the right to opt for civil settlements of family-law cases, the Grand Chamber states the inefficacy 
of those provisions with regard to the applicant, whose situation needs to be framed in the time lapse of 
the previous legal system. 
In the light of the above and benefiting from an interlaced analysis of the European Convention with the 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities24, the Grand Chamber concludes for 
the violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 1, Protocol No 1, in that by neglecting the 
                                                          
20 On it, see H.J. HEINTZE, Article 3, M. WELLER ed., Oxford Commentaries on International Law. The Rights of Minorities. 
A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Oxford University Press, 
2005, who, specifically, notices that “[i]n modern societies, […] persons have multiple identities that coincide, 
coexist, or form layers, reflecting their various associations. However, identities are not based solely on ethnicity, 
nor they have uniform within the same community. Identity can be held by different members to varying degrees 
and can be more or less salient. This means that the same person might identify herself or himself in different and 
arrangement for her or him in a particular situation or context”. 
21 See, § 157. For an investigation into the international mechanisms of protection towards minorities, see P. 
THORNBERRY, M.A. MARTÌN ESTEBANEZ, Minority Rights in Europe: A Review of the Work and Standards of the Council 
of Europe, Council of Europe Publishing, 2004 and International Law and the Rights of Minorities, Clarendon Press, 
1991; G. PENTASSUGLIA, Minorities in International Law: An Introductory Study, Council of Europe Publishing, 2002. 
22 See, § 157. 
23 See, § 157. 
24 M. WELLER ed., Oxford Commentaries on International Law. The Rights of Minorities. A Commentary on the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Oxford University Press, 2005. 
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applicant the right to inherit her husband’s estate she has been discriminated against by association on 
the ground of religion. 
 
3. Is there a Discrimination on Religious Ground? Yes, but (Only) by Association 
The idea that Article 14 might possess a collective dimension, therefore affording an embryonic 
protection to ethnic minorities25, was smoothly put forward in the ECtHR’s case-law on travelers26, hate 
crimes against roma27 and, to same extent, it was even behind the finding of an indirect discrimination 
based on race in the landmark D.H. & Others v. Chech Republic case28. 
It was thus disappointing, in the instant case, that not only did the Grand Chamber refuse to embrace 
the applicant’s approach, in that she alleged to be a victim of a direct discrimination based on religion 
and gender, but also that it chose to frame the analysis within the strict fences of the so-called 
discrimination by association. 
The history of the notion of discrimination by association goes back to European Union Law.  
                                                          
25 For an insight into the convention approach towards minorities, see S.M. POULTER, The rights of ethnic, religious 
and linguistic minorities, European Human Rights Law Review, 1997, 254 ss., who emphasizes that “many of the human 
rights enumerated in the Convention do directly assist members of minority groups and communities in asserting 
and maintaining their distinctive cultural identities in a collective manner. For example, the rights to freedom of 
association and assembly (Art. 11) clearly guarantee the establishment and running of cultural organisations. The 
right to freedom of expression (Art. 10) authorises the publication of newspapers, journals and magazines in 
minority languages. The right to freedom of religion (Art. 9) expressly includes a person’s freedom, in community 
with others, to manifest his or her religion in public worship and in teaching. Moreover, the state has to respect, 
in the exercise of any functions that it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the right of parents to ensure 
that such education and teaching is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions (Protocol 
1, Art. 2)”. As for religion in particular and its collective resonance, see, among others, M.D. EVANS, Manual on the 
Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas, Council of Europe Publishing, 2009, 34 and in the case-law, special 
references go to ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, § 118; Izzetin Dogan and others v. Turkey; 
Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia. For a more extensive analysis of the approach of the ECtHR towards 
minorities within a comparative perspective focused on Italy, see, for example, C. NARDOCCI, Razza e etnia. La 
discriminazione tra individuo e gruppo nella dimensione costituzionale e sovranazionale – Race and Ethnicity. Discrimination between 
the individual and the group in the constitutional and supranational perspective, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, Napoli, 2016, [in 
Italian]. 
26 Reference is to ECtHR, Buckley v. United Kingdom, Chapman v. United Kingdom (for a comment, see J. RINGELHEIM, 
Chapman redux: the European Court of Human Rights and Roma traditional lifestyle, E. BREMS ed., Diversity and European 
Human Rights. Rewriting Judgments of the ECHR, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 426 ss. 426 ss.) Connors v. United 
Kingdom (for a note on the case, see C. CAHN, Towards Realising a Right to Positive Action for Roma in Europe: Connors v. 
UK, Roma Rights Quarterly, 2005, 13 ss.) and, more recently, For a comment, see R. SANDLAND, Developing a 
Jurisprudence of Difference:The Protection of the Human Rights of Travelling Peoples by the European Court of Human Rights, in 
Human Rights Law Review, 2008, 475 ss. 
27 See ECtHR, Nachova & Others v. Bulgaria,  
28 For an analysis of the Judgement, see S. SPILIOPOULOU AKERMARK, Images of children in education: a critical reading 
of D.H. & others v. Czech Republic, in E. BREMS (ed.), Diversity and European Human Rights. Rewriting Judgments of the 
ECHR, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, 40 ss. 
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The concept was firstly suggested by the European Court of Justice in S. Coleman v. Attridge Law and Steve 
Law in the context of a discrimination case on the ground of disability29, where the ECJ was asked whether 
“the principle of equal treatment and the prohibition of direct discrimination apply equally to an 
employee who is not himself disabled but who, as in the instant case, is treated less favourably by reason 
of the disability of his child for whom he is the primary provider of the care required by virtue of the 
child’s condition”30. 
In that case, the European Court of Justice, following the Advocate General (AG) Poiares Maduro’s 
opinion, offered for the very first time an extensive interpretation of the concept of protected ground, 
within the meaning of the Council Directive2000/78/EC, stating that “the prohibition of direct 
discrimination […] is not limited only to people who are themselves disabled”, but it also covers those 
who are, have been or would be reserved a less favorable treatment even when they do not themselves 
possess the protected characteristic. 
As acknowledged in literature, in endorsing the concept of discrimination by association, the ECJ has 
greatly contributed to broaden EU antidiscrimination law in its ability to intercept discriminatory 
behavior, though leaving aside and unanswered three separate issues.  
The first, as outlined, concerns “the nature of the association between the victim of discrimination and 
the person with the protected attribute for the protection to be extended”31; the second whether indirect 
discrimination could also be protected; third whether the concept of discrimination by association might 
similarly spread beyond disability to include other factors such as gender, race or ethnic origin32, where 
no relationship of care exists between the victim and the bearer of the protected ground. 
On the last two points, the European Court of Justice offered a preliminary response in CHEZ 
Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v. Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, where the concept of discrimination by 
association has been applied beyond disability to ethnic origin and race, allowing protection even to 
indirect discrimination by association.   
In that case, the ECJ argued that: “[t]he concept of ‘discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin’ […] 
must be interpreted as being intended to apply […] irrespective of whether that collective measure affects 
                                                          
29 On this, see A. STEWART, S. NICCOLAI, C. HOSKYNS, Disability Discrimination by Association: A Case of the Double 
Yes?, in Social & Legal Studies, 20(2), 2011, 173 ss.; G.N. TOGGENBURG, Discrimination by association: A notion covered 
by EU equality law?, in Eur. L. Reporter, 2008,  87 ss.; L. WADDINGTON, Protection for Family and Friends: Addressing 
Discrimination by Association, in Eur. Anti-Discrim.L.Rev., 2007,15 ss. 
30 § 33. 
31 A. ERIKSSON, European Court of Justice: Broadening the scope of European nondiscrimination law, in International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 2009, 731 ss. 
32 Ibid.  
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persons who have a certain ethnic origin or those who, without possessing that origin, suffer, together 
with the former, the less favourable treatment or particular disadvantage resulting from that measure”33. 
The concept of discrimination by association has then gained attention by the European Court of Human 
Rights, in the case of Guberina v. Croatia, where the ECtHR, in a case involving the applicant’s request for 
a tax exemption due to the disability of his son, held that: “the words ‘other status’ have generally been 
given a wide meaning in its case-law […] and their interpretation has not been limited to characteristics 
which are personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent. […]. It thus follows, in the light of its 
objective and nature of the rights which it seeks to safeguard, that Article 14 of the Convention also 
covers instances in which an individual is treated less favourably on the basis of another person’s status 
or protected characteristics”34.  
Same interpretation of the corollaries of the non-discrimination principle was also endorsed in a case of 
racist hate crime by association, Škorjanec v. Croatia, where the European Court similarly held that: “the 
obligation on the authorities to seek a possible link between racist attitudes and a given act of violence, 
[…] concerns not only acts of violence based on a victim’s actual or perceived personal status or 
characteristics but also acts of violence based on a victim’s actual or presumed association or affiliation 
with another person who actually or presumably possesses a particular status or protected 
characteristic”35. 
On this last note, Molla Sali v. Greece was the very first case the Grand Chamber assessed the recurrence 
of a religious discrimination by association, in that the applicant was thought as been the victim of a 
discrimination not for being herself member of the minority, but for being the wife of a member of the 
Muslim community of Western Thrace. 
With this regard, the Grand Chamber states that: “since the main focus of the […] case is the Court of 
Cassation’s refusal to apply the law of succession […] for reasons linked to the Muslim faith of the testator, 
the applicant’s husband, the primary issue arising is whether there was a difference in treatment 
potentially amounting to discrimination as compared with the application of the law of succession […] 
to those seeking to benefit from a will as drawn up by a testator who was not of Muslim faith”36. 
What was thus crucial in structuring the judgment was the choice of the comparator – a married female 
beneficiary of a non-Muslim husband’s will – that results from the overlap of the direct victim of the 
                                                          
33ECJ, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, § 1. 
34 ECtHR, Guberina v. Croatia, § 78. 
35 ECtHR, Škorjanec v. Croatia, § 56. 
36 ECtHR, Molla Sali v. Greece, § 86. 
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discriminatory conduct with the testator (the applicant’s husband) rather than with the beneficiary (the 
applicant).  
This way of reasoning allowed the Court to shift the focus of its scrutiny from the applicant’s status to 
that of her husband.  
In other words, one thing is judging a case by looking at the applicant’s status as inherently bonded to his 
or hers personal traits, another is questioning the consequences that another person’s status and traits, 
somehow related to the applicant’s, might entail on the latter. The resort to such a de relato analysis, in 
that the Grand Chamber looked at the applicant solely on the ground of her affiliation with her husband, 
opened the doors to the concept of discrimination by association. 
However, two intertwined issues arise from this choice. 
First, and in line with the concurring opinion of Judge Mits, the fact that the applicant, Molla Sali, was 
treated less favourably because she was married with a member of the Muslim minority was not “the only 
constitutive element of the case”37.   
As rightly pointed out, “[i]f one follows the […] logic concerning the special legal regulation applicable 
in Thrace geared to protecting the Muslim minority, then the proper comparator which the Grand 
Chamber should have used is whether ‘a married Muslim woman who was a beneficiary of her Muslim 
husband’s will, was in an analogous or relevantly similar situation to that of a married non-Muslim female 
beneficiary of a non-Muslim husband’s will’”38. 
That is to say that the applicant was herself a victim within the meaning of Article 35 ECHR and that the 
Grand Chamber would have better ascertained that “there has been a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the grounds of the applicant’s husband’s and her 
religion”39 instead of confining its examination on the discrimination by association limb. 
Second, to be more accurate, if one bears in mind the above mentioned definition of discrimination by 
association emerged in EU antidiscrimination law, it is self-evident that the specifics of this type of 
discrimination rests on the absence of any objective affiliation between the victim of discrimination and 
the suspect or protected ground.  
                                                          
37 See the Concurring Opinion of Judge MITS, § 7. 
38 Ibid., § 8. This is in fact the right comparator. The fact that a non-Muslim woman married to a Muslim man 
would have suffered from the same consequences as the applicant, it is not relevant here since the issue was 
whether the applicant suffered from a difference in treatment as a result of being member of the minority group.  
39 Ibid., § 13. 
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The wording “by association” therefore implies that prejudices suffered by the victim go well beyond 
those who possess that human trait for including, conversely, those who are merely affiliated to the 
former.  
In the instant case, though, the applicant did possess the said characteristic, being herself a Muslim 
together and even before being the wife of a Muslim man.  
In other words, as to the concept of discrimination by association,“[a]n interesting peculiarity featuring 
in Molla Sali is that the testator’s religion, which lies at the root of the applicant’s discrimination by 
association, is also her own religion, as she, too, is a Muslim of the minority population of Western 
Thrace. This is most uncommon […since] in the typical scheme […] the person suffering discrimination 
by association does not bear the protected characteristic and does not belong to the disadvantaged group 
him or herself”40. 
It is thus questionable why the Grand Chamber chose to overlook the applicant’s religious affiliation 
(and gender41), bypassing the fact that she herself has been the victim of a direct discrimination based on 
religion. 
Should the Grand Chamber ever wanted to hinge on the relationship between the applicant and her 
husband and on the legal consequences deriving from it, it would have done to do so by recognizing 
prima facie the direct discrimination suffered by the applicant and only after that by association. 
By contrast, reading the case through the lens of the associative dimension of the discriminatory behavior 
undermined the finding of the direct discrimination based on religion and a truthful investigation into 
the collective dimension of the claim42. 
The Grand Chamber therefore endorses a very peculiar type of discrimination by association, that highly 
diverges from the concept suggested by the ECJ.  
Moreover, religion was not the only feature the applicant and her husband had in common as both 
belonged to the same minority suggesting a shared ethnic background that likewise contribute to distance 
the relationship between Molla Sali and her husband to that existing in a traditional discrimination by 
association scheme. 
                                                          
40 N. KOUMOUTZIS, C. PAPASTYLIANOS, Human Rights Issues Arising from the Implementation of Sharia Law on the 
Minority of Western Thrace—ECtHR Molla Sali v. Greece, Application No. 20452/14, 19 December 2018, in Religions, 2019, 
9. 
41 For a study on the condition of Muslim women in Western Thrace, see, among others,  I. TSAVOUSOGLOU, The 
Legal Treatment of Muslim Minority Women under the Rule of Islamic Law in Greek Thrace, in Oslo Law Review, 2015, 241 
ss.; A. TSAOUSSI, E. ZERVOGIANNI, Multiculturalism and Family Law: The Case of Greek Muslims (May 25, 2011). 
European Challenges in Contemporary Family Law, 209 ss., K. BOELE-WOELKI, T. SVERDRUP, eds., Intersentia, 
2008; Islamic Law and Law of the Muslim World No. 08-17.  
42 On this, see Paragraph No 4. 
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The preferred reasoning (and comparator) has thus led to two main consequences: first and foremost, 
the absence of any investigation on the compliance of Sharia Law with the European Convention; second, 
the scarce attention payed to dissident members and to intra-communitarian dynamics, that resulted in a 
missing “elaboration on the role of the state in a contemporary European democracy characterized by 
religious diversity”43. 
With respect to the former, the argument is that by interpreting the case as featuring a discrimination by 
association, in which the applicant suffered a discrimination only because she was affiliated to her 
husband, the Grand Chamber avoided to take a stand as to the contested compliance of Sharia Law with 
the principle of gender equality safeguarded by the European Convention. 
Notwithstanding the Grand Chamber seems to acknowledge and share the concerns of international 
bodies as to the unequal treatment suffered by Muslim women and children due to the compulsory 
application of Sharia Law within small communities, it nevertheless limits its examination by looking at 
the testator’s faith without dealing with the overall regime applicable to all members of the community 
where major criticisms are likely to arise. 
In doing so, the Grand Chamber refrained from condemning Sharia Law and its discriminatory content 
to the detriment of minority women.  
On this, the Court agrees that: “[r]effusing members of a religious minority the right to voluntarily opt 
for and benefit from ordinary law amounts not only to discriminatory treatment but also to a breach of 
a right of cardinal importance in the field of protection of minorities, that is to say the right to free self-
identification”. 
Still, the applicant is depicted as a victim “by association” and not as the member who has been neglected 
the right to exit and to not identify with the minority.  
Hence, the Strasbourg Court, deliberately or not, sketched a clear-cut distinction between Sharia, and its 
theoretical non-compliance with human rights law standards, that is even acknowledged in the judgement, 
and the way in which it is specifically implemented in Western Thrace, that is conversely reserved no 
accurate examination. A logic, which sheds a dark light on the Grand Chamber’s willingness to fully 
unveil the problematic application of Sharia Law towards the applicant. 
This way of reasoning had far-reaching implications in that it contributed to silence the recurrence of the 
discrimination based on gender alleged by the applicant, who claimed that she would have not been 
                                                          
43R. UITZ, The Vices of Leaving this Undecided, in Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 2019, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2019/01/the-
vices-of-leaving-this-undecided/. 
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reserved same treatment were she not a woman. And, indeed, according to Sharia Law, the applicant’s 
inheritance rights would not be compromised to the extent they were, had she not been a woman. 
Accordingly and notwithstanding the circumstances of the case were crystal-clear in portraying the 
unequal and hierarchical structure of family relations in Western Thrace, gender, as ground of 
discrimination, is never evoked in the judgement and similarly the Grand Chamber refrained from linking 
its concerns towards Sharia Law with the specificities of Molla Sali. 
Whether this option was linked to reasons other than the willingness to “save” the admissibility of the 
application and to reject exceptions on the applicant’s lack of victim status is hard to say and open to 
debate.  
What can be argue is that the outcome is a judgement where, the procedural and substantial implications 
underneath this “new” type of discrimination by association are combined in a way that granted the 
Grand Chamber to avoid a full disclosure of the human rights violations invoked. 
In a nutshell, the approach is misleading. It is based on a new and heterogeneous type of discrimination 
by association which has little in common with the concept proposed by the ECJ and its ratio, that is to 
say enlarging the scope of anti-discrimination laws. On it, in fact, as the applicant was also a victim of a 
discrimination on the basis of religion and gender, there was no need for the ECtHR to make use of the 
discrimination by association scheme in the first place.   
The result is the neglection of a fruitful confrontation with the Muslim world and with Muslim women, 
who deserve at the same time to be Muslims and to have their rights fully protected under State laws. 
 
4. A Glance to Internal Minorities (or Maybe not): between Individual Self-Identification and 
Collective Rights  
Alongside implications surrounding the upheld finding of a discrimination by association, Molla Sali v. 
Greece is also the very first case the ECtHR was solicited to deal with intra-communitarian conflicts and 
with an invoked right to not exercise a minority right. 
The Strasbourg Court was actually asked to verify whether the compulsory application of Sharia Law, 
introduced by Greece as a form of minority protection under international agreements, was in compliance 
with liberal human rights law standards centered on individuals status. 
 First and foremost, it is noteworthy that the European Court bonds its reasoning to the so-called right 
to self-identification, allowing the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities to have a say in the judgment. 
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Despite Greece’s lacking ratification of the Framework Convention, this is undoubtedly a welcome and 
remarkable move, in that the Strasbourg Court rarely gives access and links its reasonings to other 
international treaties44.  
What’s more, this choice greatly contributes to show an embryonic willingness to embrace an holistic 
path aimed at balancing individuals and group rights without automatically siding with the former, 
neglecting legal substance to the latter45. 
From this viewpoint, the Grand Chamber endorses the option of those who suggest that, in a context of 
minority protection where groups are given forms of autonomy, the State might enforce and safeguard 
collective rights46 as long as they do not entail internal restrictions on members of the minority47.  
In line with these approach, three conditions have to be met: reciprocity of rights between minority 
members and the majority in compliance with a general principle of formal equality; voluntary self-
ascription to the minority, which encompasses individuals’ self-identification; freedom to choose to be 
member or conversely to exit the group48.  
Molla Sali v. Greece raises a question of self-ascription and exit as the applicant asked to be exempted from 
the compulsory application of Sharia Law. The denial to choose civil Courts over religious jurisdiction, 
which lies at the core of the application, is rightly interpreted by the Grand Chamber as a violation of the 
                                                          
44 On the relationship and mutual interactions between the ECtHR and the FCNM, see S.E. BERRY, A tale of two 
instruments: religious minorities and the Council of Europe’s rights regime, Neth  Q. Hum. Rts., 2012, 10 ss. 
45 Extensive literature exists on the dichotomy between collective rights and individual rights which relies on the 
discussion that juxtaposes liberals versus communitarians. For an analysis of the debate see, among many others, 
see M. WALZER, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, Political Theory, 1990, 6 ss.; B. PAREKH, Rethinking 
Multiculturalism, Palgrave McMillan, 2006 and Dilemmas of a Multicultural Theory of Citizenship, Constellations, 1997, 54 
ss.; W. KYMLICKA, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989 and Multicultural 
Citizenship. A liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford University Press, 2003; C. TAYLOR, Multiculturalism. Examining the 
politics of recognition, A. GUTMAN, ed., Princeton University Press, 1994; J. RAZ, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1986. On the concept of collective rights in its contentious relationship with that of 
individual right, see Y. DISTEIN, Collective human rights of people and minorities, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 
1976, 102 ss.; M. GALENKAMP, Individualism Versus Collectivism: The Concept of Collective Rights, Erasmus Univ., Fac. 
der Wijsbegeerte, Rotterdam, 1993; L. GREEN, Two Views of Collective Rights, in Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence, 1991, 315 ss.; L. MCDONALD, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, Melbourne University Law Review, 
1998, 310 ss.; J. NARVESON, Collective Rights?, in Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 1991, 329 ss.; M. SANDERS, 
Collective rights, Human Rights Quarterly, 1991, 368 ss.; V. VAN DYKE, Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in 
Liberal-Democratic Thought, The Journal of Politics, 1982, 21 ss. 
46 For an overview of international human rights law approach towards collective rights, see, for example, A. 
XANTHAKI, Collective rights: the case of indigenous people, Amicus Curiae, 2000, 7 ss., who, prior to the coming into force 
of the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, discussed on the existing mechanisms 
safeguarding group rights: Article 27 ICCPR; Articles 1 & 2 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Article 1(4) of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination.  
47 See L. GREEN, Rights of Exit, Legal Theory, 1998, 165 ss. 
48 For an in-depth analysis of the right to exit, see A. PHILLIPS, Multiculturalism without culture, Princeton University 
Press, Oxford, 2007. 
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right to exit the group in that the State did not grant protection to the individual right to not identify with 
the minority of belonging.  
But the question that might arise following the reasoning of the Court is: the right of who? The applicant 
as victim by association? Her husband as the “real” victim of a direct discrimination based on religion? 
As it will be further discussed, the main criticism the judgement gives rise concerns the option to identify 
the applicant’s husband with the bearer of the right to not identify with the minority, rather than the 
applicant.  
In other words, it can be argued here that the right to not identify with the minority and its corollaries 
(i.e. the right to opt for civil jurisdiction) were given a wrong interpretation that lead to a lacking safeguard 
of the applicant’s conflicting relationship with the minority. 
In Molla Sali v. Greece, the Strasbourg Court derives, as said, its main argumentation from Article 3 § 1 of 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities that, according to its Explanatory 
Report: “guarantees to every person belonging to a national minority the freedom to choose to be treated 
or not to be treated as such [, …leaving] it to every such person to decide whether or not he or she wishes 
to come under the protection flowing from the principles of the framework Convention”49. 
Despite “individual’s subjective choice is inseparably linked to objective criteria relevant to the person’s 
identity”, the Report goes on highlighting that: “no disadvantage shall arise from the free choice it 
guarantees, or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice [and that t]his ... 
provision aims to secure that the enjoyment of the freedom to choose shall also not be impaired 
indirectly”50. 
 
Departing from the right to self-identification, which also compromises the right to not identify with the 
community of belonging, the Strasbourg Court grappled with an attempted theoretical balance between 
individuals versus collective rights, that nevertheless left unclear whether the Strasbourg Court addresses 
the issue from the applicant’s perspective rather than her husband’s. 
A first element that buttresses the argument of a non-truthful or at least of a lenient investigation into 
the existing tensions within the minority community emerges from § 143 of the judgement, where the 
Strasbourg Court, arguing on the pursuit of a legitimate aim, held that: “[a]lthough the Court understands 
that Greece is bound by its international obligations concerning the protection of the Thrace Muslim 
minority in the particular circumstances of the case, it doubts whether the impugned measure regarding 
                                                          
49 Explanatory report on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, § 34. 
50 Ibid., § 36. 
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the applicant’s inheritance rights was suited to achieve that aim. Be that as it may, it is not necessary for 
the Court to adopt a firm view on this issue because in any event the impugned measure was in any event 
not proportionate to the aim pursued”51. 
Though justified by its case-by-case evaluation, such a statement somehow endorses an hands-off 
approach, in that the Court refuses to interfere within the minority rights regime existing in Western 
Thrace. 
Quite interestingly, though, the following paragraphs seems more fitting for this effort.  
Moving on to the proportionality test, the Court argues in fact that: “[r]efusing members of a religious 
minority the right to voluntarily opt for and benefit from ordinary law amounts not only to discriminatory 
treatment but also to a breach of a right of cardinal importance in the field of protection of minorities, 
that is to say the right to free self-identification – which also encompasses, goes on the Court – “the right 
to choose not to be treated as a member of a minority”52.  
The Court also claims that: “according to its case-law, freedom of religion does not require the 
Contracting States to create a particular legal framework in order to grant religious communities a special 
status entailing specific privileges. Nevertheless, a State which has created such a status must ensure that 
the criteria established for a group’s entitlement to it are applied in a non-discriminatory manner”, and, 
lastly, that the State cannot “take on the role of guarantor of the minority identity of a specific population 
group to the detriment of the right of that group’s members to choose not to belong to it or not to follow 
its practices and rules”53. 
Significant statements, in that the Court endorses and asks for a minority regime not entailing such severe 
limitations – Kymlicka’s internal restrictions – of the individuals rights of those belonging to the 
minority54, and, yet, it decides to do so by looking solo at the testator.  
The “non-discriminatory manner” seems, in fact, more suitable for a Muslim versus non-Muslim testators 
context rather than for a Muslim versus non-Muslim women comparison. An approach which seems 
problematic with respect to the gender-specificities of the case.  
                                                          
51 ECtHR, Molla Sali v. Greece, § 143. 
52 ECtHR, Molla Sali v. Greece, § 157. 
53 Ibid., § 155. 
54 See, on this, also § 158: “Greece is the only country in Europe which, up until the material time, applied Sharia 
law to a section of its citizens against their wishes. This is particularly problematic in the present case because the 
application of Sharia law caused a situation that was detrimental to the individual rights of a widow who had 
inherited her husband’s estate in accordance with the rules of civil law but who then found herself in a legal 
situation which neither she nor her husband had intended”. 
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On it, it seems the Grand Chamber missed the opportunity to raise criticisms as to the treatment of 
minority women within small communities, who often found themselves victims of multiple or 
intersectional discriminations. 
Be as it may, the judgement remains quite ambiguous on this note.  
On the one hand, as highlighted above, the Grand Chamber embraces an individualistic approach taking 
on the challenge to balance individuals versus group rights55, favoring a redesign of the relationship 
between the State and the minority group, that suggests that the State might interfere to the extent it is 
capable to remove violations of individual rights affecting members of the community.  
The central point of the reasoning lies in fact in the refusal of a minority rights regime, that neglects the 
free exit of its members56 and denies the positive and negative aspects of group membership, meaning 
that a member can belong to a minority or not, can exercise the rights of a minority or not. 
The Grand Chamber criticises Greece for being “too open” in its communitarian-based commitment 
towards the Muslim community of Western Thrace, moving forward the debate on minority rights and 
State sovereignty. 
On the other, though, it is regrettable that the recognition of the right to accept or conversely refuse 
minority status did not really take the applicant and, as a consequence, internal minorities and dissident 
members into proper consideration.  
From this viewpoint, it could be argued that it might have been the reluctance to see the case through 
the eyes of the applicant, that have impeded the Grand Chamber from taking an additional step, applying 
the right to self-identification on her as well. 
In other words, a per relationem analysis as such suggested by the Grand Chamber in building the case 
moving from the notion of discrimination by association, tackled just half of the problem, that is that 
pertaining the relationship between the State and the dissident but majority member of the group (i.e. the 
applicant’s husband), while the other half, that governing the State versus the minority in terms of its 
legitimacy to interfere on behalf of internal minorities and/or minority members (i.e. the applicant), 
remains unsolved. 
Should the Grand Chamber had engaged in the analysis of the direct discrimination suffered by the 
applicant on gender and religious grounds, this additional facet of the claim would have more easily 
emerged and eventually assessed in the judgement.  
                                                          
55 See § 156. 
56 See § 157. 
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However, as long as the Grand Chamber chooses not to challenge internal rules governing the life of the 
minority, gender and religious discriminations affecting minority women are not really under 
examination. 
We all agree that the right to self-identification is a cornerstone of international human rights law on the 
protection of minorities and it is noteworthy that the Grand Chamber insisted on it condemning Greece’s 
policies towards the Muslim community of Western Thrace in that they in practice do not allow members 
to resort to civil law and jurisdiction. 
As the right to not identify with the group is dominant here, we would all agree more were it equally 
applied to minority members and to the applicant as well.  
 
5. Conclusions: a New Path for Minority Rights Regime? 
Several questions were underneath the judgment.  
First and foremost, one revolved around the role of the margin appreciation doctrine and of the Grand 
Chamber in condemning or, viceversa, condoning Greece’s policies towards the Muslim minority of 
Western Thrace. 
Will therefore the Grand Chamber uphold the historical and geopolitical reasons behind the current 
regulation of the relationships between Greece and the Muslim minority or will it give up its scrutiny 
over a preferred resort to the margin of appreciation57?  
From this perspective, Greece’s reform with Law No. 411 of 2018 – providing members of the Muslim 
community of Wester Thrace with the right to opt for State laws and requiring a prior agreement between 
the parties to establish the Mufti’s jurisdiction – seems to have had little impact on the judgement, at least 
explicitly.  
On the one hand, the Grand Chamber followed its tendency to confine its judgement at the time of the 
application without conversely hinging on the changing legal framework coming slowly into force prior 
to the judgment. 
                                                          
57 On the nature and implications surrounding the use and misuse of this doctrine, see, among many, S. GREER, 
The Margin Of Appreciation: Interpretation And Discretion Under The European Convention On Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, Strasburg, 2000; G. LETSAS, A theory of interpretation of the European Convention of Human rights, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 and Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
2006, 705 ss.; H.C. YOUROW, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996; A. YUTAKA, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in 
the Jurisprudence of the ECHR, Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002; M. SAUL, The European Court of Human Rights’ Margin of 
Appreciation and the Processes of National Parliaments, Human Rights Law Review, 2015, 745 ss.; O.M. ARNARDÓTTIR, The 
Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under 
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review, 2014, 647 ss. 
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On the other, Greece’s decision to amend by law some of the main criticisms surrounding the status of 
the Muslim Minority of Western Thrace right after the public hearing of December 2017 must have 
helped the Grand Chamber to set aside fears of overstepping its supervisory role58.  
That being said, it is unclear whether the margin of appreciation would have possibly gained more weight 
if the Grand Chamber had chosen to engage in a balance between the applicant and the minority without 
rewriting the case as depicting a discrimination by association.  
Put differently, even though the Grand Chamber refrained from recalling explicitly the margin of 
appreciation in its judgement, it is noteworthy that the resort to the notion of discrimination by 
association must have highly contributed to hide a willingness to evade questions as to the compatibility 
of Greece’s system of personal law with the European Convention. 
Not surprisingly, but following the Government’s exceptions59, the Grand Chamber never even engaged 
in a distinction between Molla Sali and Refah Partisi v. Turkey, which similarly brought about concerns as 
to the role of the State in accommodating or limiting religious diversity in a context of religious 
                                                          
58 In a nutshell, Law No 4511 of 2018 introduced a new paragraph to Article 5, Law No 1920 of 1991, providing 
members of the Muslim community of Western Thrace with the right to opt for civil jurisdiction. The Mufti 
jurisdiction becomes therefore exceptional and based on a previous agreement between the parties. For a comment, 
see Y. SEZGIN, The Greek Mufti System in a Global Perspective: Reform in the Triangle of Thrace, Athens and Strasbourg, 
Remarks prepared for the event entitled “Sharia in Europe? — In Anticipation of the ECtHR Ruling on the Molla 
Sali v Greece Case” Aga Khan Centre, London, 8 Oct 2018. Some consider the optional jurisdiction not sufficient 
as to overcome issues related to the compatibility of Sharia Law with the Greek Constitution and human rights 
standards. See A. TSAOUSSI, E. ZERVOGIANNI, Multiculturalism and Family Law: The Case of Greek Muslims, cit., 221 
ss. Another interesting aspect of the new law concerns the ex ante constitutional review prior to the enactment of 
the Muftis rulings. On it, see Y. SEZGIN, op. cit., who observes that: “[i]f ex ante constitutional review can be 
conducted properly and effectively, for this to happen, […]: the Court of Cassation […] must change its essentialist 
and discriminatory attitude towards Thracian Muslims and the mufti system; judges from the minority should be 
represented in the civil judiciary; civil judges in Thrace should be trained in Islamic law; procedural and substantive 
Islamic laws should be codified (or “ascertained”); and mufti decisions should be fully translated into Greek, 
including case details, evidence, rules, etc. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, a special court of appeal can be set 
up to review mufti decisions, rather than asking civil judges and courts to do that.). If Muslim Thracians can 
effectively utilize the concurrent system […] the following conditions must be satisfied: the government must 
recruit judges from the minority to civil courts; work with civil society to set up legal aid clinics that will help 
women and other underserved groups lodge cases in civil courts; increase awareness of civil option among 
communities in the region; and provide pro bono translation services; If every individual appearing before mufti 
is represented by a lawyer and those who cannot afford it are appointed pro bono legal counsel”. 
59 See § 111 of the Judgement: “The Government invited the Court to draw a distinction between the present case 
and the case of Refah Partisi […]. They submitted that in the instant case the Court was not called upon to consider 
in abstracto the application of a plurality of legal systems based on Sharia law, or its compatibility with fundamental 
rights. The present case had to be examined in concreto, having regard to such criteria as respect for 
multiculturalism in today’s Europe and the difficulty of formulating policies applicable to religious communities. 
In view of the complexity of the “modern identity” of the inhabitants of Europe, the Court should conduct a case-
by-case examination of each rule of Sharia law applying to actual cases concerning Muslims residing in non-Muslim 
States. The complexity criterion should be especially decisive in a case such as the present one, since the domestic 
courts had referred to international treaties as being the basis of Sharia law”. 
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pluralism60. Nevertheless, in that case, the Grand Chamber, hinging on the Chamber’s conclusions, took 
a clear stand against religious pluralism in case of gross violations of human rights. 
It was held in fact that: “plurality of legal systems […] cannot be considered to be compatible with the 
Convention system […] for two reasons. Firstly, it would do away with the State’s role as the guarantor 
of individual rights and freedoms and the impartial organiser of the practice of the various beliefs and 
religions in a democratic society, since it would oblige individuals to obey, not rules laid down by the 
State in the exercise of its above-mentioned functions, but static rules of law imposed by the religion 
concerned. But the State has a positive obligation to ensure that everyone within its jurisdiction enjoys in 
full, and without being able to waive them, the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention […]. 
Secondly, such a system would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination between 
individuals as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms, which is one of the fundamental principles of 
democracy”61. 
As stated already, the major criticism in Molla Sali arises from the lacking protection granted to the 
applicant as victim herself of an intersectional discrimination based on religion and gender. 
With regard to the merit, as discussed above, the case raised the issue of the discriminatory dimension of 
the claim and of its intersectional nature62, having the applicant invoked the violation of Article 14 ECHR 
on both grounds of religion and gender.  
Here’s where the judgement is way too disappointing. 
If the question of the compatibility of Sharia Law with the European Convention could have expected 
to be somehow avoided or circumvented, nor that concerning the direct discriminatory effects on 
religious ground suffered by the applicant, whose status has instead been neglected in the judgement.  
Be it for the unsaid willingness to go too far in sanctioning Greek’s system of minority protection or for 
the inherent weaknesses of the European Convention’s architecture towards disparity of treatment63, 
references to the right to self-identification did not in itself resulted in a successful balance between the 
competing interests at stake.  
                                                          
60 In a comparative perspective and on the interplay between religion and pluralism, see M. D’AMICO, Constitutional 
Secularism and Religious Fundamentalism in Italy And Europe: Considerations Stemming From Judicial Decisions, Italian Review 
of Legal History, 2017, 1 ss. and, more generally, Contended Rights. Contemporary issues of Constitutionalism, FrancoAngeli, 
Milano, 2016 [in Italian]. 
61 See § 119. 
62 For a pioneer study of the notion and implications of the concepts of intersectional discrimination, see K. 
CRENSHAW, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color, Stanford Law Review, 
1991, 1241 ss.; and Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, University of Chicago Legal Form, 1989, 57 ss. 
63 The reference here is to Greece’s lacking ratification of Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR which could have enforced 
the discriminatory claims brought by the applicant. 
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The applicant evoked a conflict within the minority and blamed State’s inability to act on her behalf. The 
Grand Chamber, on its part, replied by siding her claim apart, arguing in favor of a general principle of 
equal treatment between members and non-members of the minority community and not, as it was 
behind the application, between members, men and women, belonging to the said minority community. 
The fact that, in a context where a minority is entitled with territorial or non-territorial autonomy, the 
constitutional principle of equality must be safeguarded on both sides – for those in and for those outside 
the minority in their mutual interactions – is no question, at least for theorists who advocate for a liberal 
conception of multiculturalism64.  
Molla Sali did not merely (not only) build her case by comparing herself to non-Muslim women having 
no linkages with the minority, but she did it (also) by looking at the other members of the community 
giving voice to intra-communitarian conflicts and raising criticism as to treatment reserved to minority 
women. 
On this, however, the Grand Chamber quite simply ignored her claim.  
What then? What remains after Molla Sali v. Greece as to the place of minority and dissident members’ 
rights within the European Convention? 
As outlined above, the reference to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
widened the reasoning of the Court, giving entrance to the right to self-identification as a key argument 
to sustain the alleged violations.  
Nonetheless seemed to be on the right track, the Court though failed to adequately address intra-
communitarian dynamics, giving up a chance for suggesting new ways of minority protection aimed at 
integrating existing mechanisms, operating on the vertical line between the State vis-à-vis the minority, 
with the needs of dissident members and internal minorities, too often forgotten or wrongly compared 
to those whose aspiration is to exit permanently the group65. 
Good news we had a strategic case in Strasbourg, unveiling tensions within minority communities. Bad 
news the European Court of Human Rights wasn’t ready or willing to go beyond theoretical statements 
and to tackle the entire issue served before it. 
                                                          
64 On the problematic status of internal minorities and dissident members, see L. GREEN, Internal Minorities and their 
Rights, in Group Rights, University of Toronto Press, 1994, 257 ss. For a liberal approach to multiculturalism, which 
argue for a temperament of communitarian features, see, among others, W. KYMLICKA, Multicultural Citizenship. A 
liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
65 On this, see H. H. WEI, A Dialogical Concept of Minority Rights, Studies in International Minority and Group Rights, 
Brill, 2016, 161 ss., who elaborates on the so-called right to remain and on the right to internal dialogue as a way 
to safeguard dissident members from the negative consequences arising out from their exit from the cultural group 
of belonging. 
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Hopefully, more Molla Sali’s are yet to come and, eventually, the European Court of Human Rights will 
be forced to truthfully say where it wants to stand: with the State and the minority who acts against its 
members or with the latter. In other words, the European Court of Human Rights will likely be asked to 
consider the alternative between a non-interference approach in the relationship between the nation State 
and the minority or a more pervasive intervention which could impact eventually on the group’s internal 
affairs. 
It would have been enough, as for now, to at least portray the case as it were without looking for 
procedural escapes. Better luck next time. 
